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LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT OF A BILL  
OF RIGHTS: A WAY TO RECTIFY  
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
DUANE L. OSTLER

 
The term ―judicial activism‖ has become a common part of modern 
American political speech, though it remains ambiguous and can often 
mean many different things.
1
 It most commonly applies to judicial 
decisions that exceed judicial authority on issues that otherwise would be 
decided by the legislature and is most frequently invoked when some 
aspect of the bill of rights is litigated.  
Political leaders in both parties have condemned judicial activism, 
particularly where it threatens their party‘s ideology. For example, in 1968 
Richard Nixon stated, ―I want men on the Supreme Court who are strict 
constructionists, men that interpret the law and don‘t try to make the 
law.‖2 In 1986 Ronald Reagan said that America has ―had too many 
examples in recent years of courts and judges legislating.‖3 Yet 
Democratic leaders can feel just as much concern for judicial activism as 
their Republican counterparts. Barack Obama expressed fear in 2012 that a 
conservative Supreme Court might disagree with the new healthcare law:  
I‘d just remind conservative commentators that, for years, what we 
have heard is, the biggest problem on the bench was judicial 
activism . . . that an unelected group of people would somehow 
overturn a duly constituted and passed law. Well . . . I‘m pretty 
confident that this court will recognize that and not take that step.
4
 
This Article asserts that judicial activism does not have to be inevitable 
and can be overcome by way of structural change to the Constitution. 
 
 
  Mr. Ostler obtained his J.D. from BYU, and practiced law in Utah for eleven years. He 
recently obtained a Ph.D. in legal history from Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia, and is 
currently a post-doctoral research fellow at the University of Queensland, in Brisbane, Australia.  
 1. See Keenan D. Kmiec, Comment, The Origin and Current Meanings of ‘Judicial Activism,’ 
92 CALIF. L. REV. 1441 (2004). 
 2. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE 
SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 112 (2009). 
 3. Jack Nelson et al., Interview Text: Reagan’s Thoughts on Arms Talks, ‘Star Wars’, L.A. 
TIMES, June 24, 1986, at 18, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1986-06-24/news/mn-20963_1_ 
arms-control. 
 4. Jeff Mason, Obama Takes a Shot at Supreme Court Over Healthcare, REUTERS (Apr. 2, 
2012, 6:45 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/02/us-obama-healthcare-idUSBRE8310WP2 
0120402.  
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Indeed, some of the founding fathers had just such a perspective. They 
preferred legislative oversight of rights issues, rather than risking judicial 
activism by leaving such matters to the judiciary. 
MADISON‘S VIEWS ON THE BEST WAY TO PROTECT RIGHTS 
Despite having proposed the Federal Bill of Rights in 1789, James 
Madison had grave misgivings about constitutionalizing a bill of rights.
5
 
He proposed the Bill of Rights mainly to stop the call for a second 
constitutional convention, rather than out of concern for actually 
protecting rights.
6
 
However, Madison firmly believed there was a way to protect 
individual rights from state abuses, without having a bill of rights. This 
method was so vital to his thinking that he proposed it at the start of the 
Constitutional Convention in 1787. The sixth resolution of his Virginia 
Plan gave the National Legislature the power ―to negative all laws passed 
by the several States contravening in the opinion of the National 
Legislature the articles of Union.‖7 This was no afterthought, written to 
satisfy those clamouring for a bill of rights or threatening a second 
constitutional convention. Rights protection would be provided by the 
federal Congress vetoing state rights violations. 
For Madison, the legislative veto was needed as a rights protection 
because ―[e]xperience had evinced a constant tendency in the states to . . . 
[among other things] oppress the weaker party within their jurisdictions.‖8 
Madison‘s proposal for the legislative veto was initially approved by a 
majority of the delegates to the constitutional convention.
9
 It was only 
later that it was dropped, over the objections of many.
10
 Other delegates 
who supported the legislative veto included George Read, John 
 
 
 5. ―[E]xperience proves the inefficacy of a bill of rights on those occasions when its control is 
most needed. Repeated violations of these parchment barriers have been committed by overbearing 
majorities in every state.‖ 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 271, 272 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1900).  
 6. Carl T. Bogus, The Hidden History of the Second Amendment, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 309, 
362–63 (1998); LEONARD LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 39 (1999). 
 7. 3 HUNT, supra note 5, at 19.  
 8. Id. at 121. Madison‘s comments also show that the legislative veto could be useful for more 
than just protecting rights. 
 9. Id. at 55. This occurred on May 31, 1787.  
 10. Id. at 127. This occurred on June 8, 1787. The vote was seven states to three against the 
legislative veto, with one state (Delaware) divided. On Aug. 16, 1787, Charles Pinkney moved to re-
insert the legislative veto into the Constitution. The vote was closer this time, six states to five against 
the veto. 4 HUNT, supra note 5, at 286–88.  
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Dickinson,
11
 Charles Pinkney, Jacob Broome, James Wilson, James 
McClurg, and John Landgon.
12
 
One may wonder why these founders distrusted state legislatures, yet 
were willing to trust the Federal Congress with a veto. The reason 
involved factions, which Madison considered the greatest threat to 
individual rights. As he explained in The Federalist No. 10, factions could 
easily control smaller state governments, but it was less likely they would 
control the legislature of a large government, drawing its membership 
from all of the states. ―The influence of factious leaders may kindle a 
flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general 
conflagration through the other States.‖13 This is because of the greater 
sociocultural and political diversity found where there is a ―greater number 
of citizens and extent of territory.‖14 Hence, the very size of a large 
republic would be a useful tool for controlling the factions that arose 
within it. 
It is noteworthy that the legislative veto required review of a law before 
it took effect, not afterward in the courts. Madison wanted a mechanism 
whereby violations of rights could be prevented before they happened. It 
should be remembered that this was 1787, long before the incorporation 
doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment allowed the Federal Bill of Rights 
to be enforced in all the states, and long before the ‗commerce power‘ 
allowed Congress to impose legislation on the states. 
However, some members of the constitutional convention did not like 
the legislative veto. One objected that the larger number of representatives 
from the large states might use it to bully the small states.
15
 Many also 
wondered how the national legislature could review all state laws.
16
 
Ultimately, the convention changed the legislative veto significantly. They 
specified limits to state power within the Constitution in Article 1, Section 
10. If the states defied these limits, the federal judiciary could declare their 
acts unconstitutional, or, failing that, Congress would take action by 
passing a federal law.
17
 The prohibitions listed in Article 1, Section 10 
 
 
 11. 3 HUNT, supra note 5, at 127. 
 12. 4 HUNT, supra note 5, at 286–88. 
 13. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 64 (James Madison) (Jacob E Cooke ed., 1961). 
 14. Id. at 63. 
 15. 3 HUNT, supra note 5, at 125–26. 
 16. 4 HUNT, supra note 5, at 287–88. 
 17. Id. at 449. 
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were considered almost like a bill of rights.
18
 Madison‘s legislative veto 
was replaced with a judicial veto, and the potential for judicial activism 
was born. 
After the convention, Madison lamented to Jefferson over the 
replacement of the legislative veto with the inferior judicial veto: 
[A] constitutional negative on the laws of the states seems equally 
necessary to secure individuals against encroachments on their 
rights . . . . A reform therefore which does not make provision for 
private rights, must be materially defective. The restraints [in 
Article 10, Section 1] are not sufficient. Supposing them to be 
effectual as far as they go, they are short of the mark.
19
 
Madison believed the convention had missed the best way to protect rights 
by rejecting the legislative veto. A judicial veto power, although better 
than nothing, was problematic: 
It may be said that the Judicial authority, under our new system will 
keep the states within their proper limits, and supply the place of a 
negative on their laws. The answer is, that it is more convenient to 
prevent the passage of a law than to declare it void after it is 
passed.
20
 
Hence, Madison raised the very policy-making issue that is seen in judicial 
activism today. Judicial involvement only comes after a violation has 
occurred. Someone must be hurt before asking the courts for a remedy. 
Courts are aware that their decisions will be binding in the future in 
similar cases, and that their decisions create policy many feel is a task 
better left to the legislature. Madison disliked such a structure. For him, it 
was obvious that the best branch of government to protect individual rights 
was the federal legislature.  
In 1799, Madison commented pointedly about the dangers of judicial 
activism in his response to the ‗Alien and Sedition Acts‘ enacted during 
the Adams administration. These acts allowed the president to deport 
―dangerous‖ aliens and criminalized certain criticisms of the 
government.
21
 Because the authority to enact such acts was hard to find in 
 
 
 18. Referring to Article 1, Section 10, John Marshall said, ―the constitution of the United States 
contains what may be deemed a bill of rights for the people of each state.‖ Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 
87, 138 (1810). 
 19. 5 HUNT, supra note 5, at 27. 
 20. Id. at 26. 
 21. See generally JOHN CHESTER MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS 
(1951). 
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the Constitution, some justified them by arguing that the Constitution 
impliedly incorporated British common law. Madison strongly disagreed, 
asserting that the Supreme Court should not interpret the common law as 
support for a constitutional right (which is exactly what the Supreme Court 
later did in Roe v. Wade).
22
 Madison stated:  
[W]hether the common law be admitted as of legal or of 
constitutional obligation, it would confer on the judicial department 
a discretion little short of a legislative power . . . [they would] 
decide what parts of the common law would, and what would not, 
be properly applicable to the circumstances of the United States. A 
discretion of this sort has always been lamented as incongruous and 
dangerous . . . . [T]he power of the judges over the law would, in 
fact, erect them into legislators.
23
 
A clearer warning against judicial activism could hardly be found.  
Jefferson also objected to judicial activism. In 1819 he expressed 
concern over the decisions of ―unelected‖ judges who would view the 
constitution as ―a mere thing of wax . . . which they may twist and shape 
into any form they please.‖24 Other founders had similar concerns. Luther 
Martin, a delegate to the constitutional convention, noted in 1787 that ―[a] 
knowledge of mankind, and of legislative affairs cannot be presumed to 
belong in a higher degree to the Judges than to the legislature.‖25 
A THREE STEP MODEL TO RESTORE LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT OF RIGHTS  
The preference of Madison and other founders for a legislative veto 
rather than a bill of rights shows their belief that the legislature, rather than 
the judiciary, is the entity best equipped to deal with rights questions. The 
legislative veto was intended to be entrenched in the Constitution, and thus 
not easily ignored. A similar structural solution, embedded into the 
Constitution itself, appears necessary today to fix the judicial activism of 
the Supreme Court. A constitutional amendment along the lines of the 
legislative veto is called for. While Madison in his day primarily feared 
state violations of rights, the concern today is with judicial activism in 
matters that should be left to the legislature. Accordingly, the legislative 
veto should be directed toward Supreme Court rights decisions.  
 
 
 22. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 23. 6 HUNT, supra note 5, at 380–81. 
 24. 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 141 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1899). 
 25. 4 HUNT, supra note 5, at 26.  
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However, this veto power should not extend to procedural rights 
pertaining to the criminally accused. Such rights include the right to 
habeas corpus, to a jury trial, to call witnesses, and to not be compelled to 
testify against oneself. It is best to leave the resolution of these types of 
procedural criminal protections with the judiciary. If the legislature were 
to control these procedural criminal rights, their actions could amount to 
an unconstitutional ―bill of attainder,‖26 under which the legislature may 
act judicially to criminally punish a person or group that it believes 
deserves punishment, without the protection of due process of law. In 
short, the judiciary is best at overseeing procedural protections for 
criminally accused persons, while the legislature is best at resolving 
disputed policy issues.  
Hence, the amendment would apply to all rights except the procedural 
rights of the criminally accused. Many of these non-criminal rights involve 
policy issues that are highly contested today. This includes, among others, 
the so-called right of sexual privacy, the right to die, the right to free 
speech, and the right to assemble.
27
 The amendment would create a three-
step procedure to be followed with respect to such non-criminal rights. If 
anyone felt that such rights were violated, step one of the model would 
apply. Under this step, if suit under these rights was filed, the court would 
refer the issue directly to the state or federal legislature that was accused 
of committing the violation. Alternatively, the claimant could lodge his 
complaint directly with the legislature. A six month waiting period 
(similar to the 180 day waiting period in Title VII cases
28
) would follow, 
during which the legislature could potentially fix the problem. It should be 
noted that the legislature‘s action would need to be general in nature and 
not specifically directed at the claimant‘s particular case, as if the 
legislature were a court dealing only with his claim. If the legislature took 
 
 
 26. U.S. CONST. art. X, § 1. 
 27. The non-criminal rights where the new amendment may apply are as follows: free exercise of 
religion (U.S. CONST. amend. I); free speech (U.S. CONST. amend. I); free press (U.S. CONST. amend. 
I); freedom to assemble (U.S. CONST. amend. I); petition to government for redress of grievances (U.S. 
CONST. amend. I); bearing arms (U.S. CONST. amend. II); quartering of soldiers (U.S. CONST. amend. 
III); due process, other than procedural protections of the criminally accused (U.S. CONST. amend. V); 
takings (U.S. CONST. amend. V); privacy—abortion, marriage and other alleged sexual rights (U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV); equal protection (U.S. CONST. amend. XIV); voting (U.S. CONST. amends. XV, 
XIX, XXIV, XXVI); access to courts/agencies (implied—NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)); 
right to travel (implied—Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)); right to educate one‘s children 
(implied—Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)); right to refuse medical treatment 
(implied—Cruzan v. Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)). 
 28. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2006). 
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action and changed the law, it would apply its changes retroactively and 
thereby bring relief to the claimant and others like him. 
At the end of six months, if the legislature had not acted, or if the 
claimant still felt aggrieved in spite of the legislature‘s action, step two of 
the model would apply. Under this step, the courts would resume 
jurisdiction of the matter in cases where the claimant had initially filed 
suit, or the claimant would bring a new action in the courts. The courts 
would then rule on the matter in their normal way, thereby safeguarding 
rights if the legislature was unwilling (for political or other reasons) to act, 
or had acted in a way that was still perceived as violating rights. 
However, that would still not end the matter. The most important part 
of this new constitutional amendment would be step three, giving solely to 
the Federal Congress (not the state legislatures), by a simple majority vote, 
the power to veto the Supreme Court‘s ruling on the non-criminal rights 
issue, but not any other issue of the case. Importantly, Congress would not 
be able to engage in any judicial-type review or discussion of the matter, 
but would simply vote on whether to veto the non-criminal rights portion 
of the court decision, in order to terminate its stare decisis effect. Unlike 
the prior six month opportunity for the legislature to ‗fix‘ the problem in 
step one, this vote would not apply retroactively. Essentially, Congress 
would be declaring that, whatever resolution was achieved by the claimant 
in the court case, all similarly situated persons in the future would not be 
able to rely on the non-criminal rights portion of the Court‘s decision in 
their future cases. Indeed, by voting to veto, Congress would be creating a 
new and different stare decisis effect, which would be exactly the opposite 
of the Supreme Court ruling. 
Because this congressional veto power would be entrenched by way of 
a constitutional amendment, the Supreme Court would have to abide by 
the veto of its decision by Congress. There would be no possibility of 
further judicial review of that particular case after Congress enacted its 
veto. And that is precisely how it should be in issues of policy that are best 
left to the people, through their representatives, to decide. In effect, this 
procedure would leave highly political issues in the hands of elected 
politicians, not unelected judges. 
CONCLUSION 
The American experience at a time when it had no Bill of Rights 
highlights a method that can be used to overcome the judicial activism 
thatstigmatizes the Supreme Court today. The surest way to achieve the 
needed change is by structural alteration of the Constitution itself, by way 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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of a new amendment. The amendment would provide for a three-step 
process as described in this Article, which would alter the relationship 
between the legislature and the judiciary with respect to non-criminal 
rights. Under this new model, both the legislature and the judiciary would 
retain some contribution to the protection of rights. But the legislature 
would have the final word concerning non-criminal rights, if it felt 
strongly enough about the issue. In making this change, America can show 
the world that judicial activism is not unavoidable, and that it can be 
controlled.
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss5/8
